When asked for a range of percentage that would be diverse, however, Seattles expert said it was important to have sufficient numbers so as to avoid students feeling any kind of specter of exceptionality. App. 264, 399400 (1821) (Marshall, C. App. Rather, race-based government decisionmaking is categorically prohibited unless narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. [Footnote 1] The plan allows incoming ninth graders to choose from among any of the districts high schools, ranking however many schools they wish in order of preference. The argument ignores the dangers presented by individual classifications, dangers that are not as pressing when the same ends are achieved by more indirect means. In this case, the Ninth Circuit held that the School District had a compelling state interest in achieving racial and ethnic diversity in its individual schools. "[11] This is confirmed by the fact that Seattle has been able to achieve a desirable degree of diversity without the greater emphasis on race that drawing fine lines among minority groups would require. See post, at 6972. It also contends that racial diversity is too amorphous and uncertain a concept to be considered a compelling interest, and finally disputes as inconclusive the Districts statistics regarding the increased success rates of students in integrated schools. 539 U. S., at 324325 (internal quotation marks omitted). 214a, 225a, 257a. 2d 358, 376377 (WD Ky. 2000), that decree was dissolved in 2000, id., at 360. The district assigns students to nonmagnet schools in one of two ways: Parents of kindergartners, first-graders, and students new to the district may submit an application indicating a first and second choice among the schools within their cluster; students who do not submit such an application are assigned within the cluster by the district. Cf. See Croson, 488 U. S., at 501 (The history of racial classifications in this country suggests that blind judicial deference to legislative or executive pronouncements of necessity has no place in equal protection analysis); West Virginia Bd. Indeed, in its more recent opinions, the Court recognized that the fundamental purpose of strict scrutiny review is to take relevant differences between fundamentally different situations . Indeed, the social scientists brief rather cautiously claims the existence of any benefit at all, describing the positive impact as modest, id., at 13, acknowledging that there appears to be little or no effect on math scores, id., at 14, and admitting that the underlying reasons for these gains in achievement are not entirely clear, id., at 15. This Court has recognized that the public interests at stake in such cases are compelling. We have approved of narrowly tailored plans that are no less race-conscious than the plans before us. 05908, at 3942; Research, Evaluation and Assessment, Student Information Services Office, Seattle Public Schools Data Profile: DistrictSummary December 2005, online at http://www.seattleschools.org/ McFarland v. Jefferson Cty. That statement, to be sure, invites this response: A sense of stigma may already become the fate of those separated out by circumstances beyond their immediate control. of Oral Arg. Id. Indeed, in McDaniel, a case decided the same day as Swann, a group of parents challenged a race-conscious student assignment plan that the Clarke County School Board had voluntarily adopted as a remedy without a court order (though under federal agency pressurepressure Seattle also encountered). Yesterday, the plans under review were lawful. For one thing, consider the effect of the pluralitys views on the parties before us and on similar school districts throughout the Nation. Supreme Court 5:4 decision suggests that the Court is divided in its interpretation of Brown and its intent in . Because the Constitution emphatically does not forbid the use of race-conscious measures by districts in the South that voluntarily desegregated their schools, on what basis does the plurality claim that the law forbids Seattle to do the same? This case was originally filed in 2001 in the Western District of Washington, which ruled in favor of the school district. As well, because the racial tiebreaker is only used when more students apply to a certain school than there are spots, schools such as Ranier and Clevelandwhich have only ten percent of white students and are not popular choices remain racially imbalanced. ([A]ll governmental action based on racea group classification long recognized as in most circumstances irrelevant and therefore prohibited, Hirabayashi [v. United States, 320 U. S. 81, 100 (1943)]should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed (first emphasis in original); Metro Broadcasting, supra, at 636 ([O]ur Constitution protects each citizen as an individual, not as a member of a group (Kennedy, J., dissenting)); Bakke, supra, at 289 (opinion of Powell, J.) On what legal ground can the majority rest its contrary view? Plessy, of course, concerned official classification by race applicable to all persons who sought to use railway carriages. In Seattle, the district seeks white enrollment of between 31 and 51 percent (within 10 percent of the district white average of 41 percent), and nonwhite enrollment of between 49 and 69 percent (within 10 percent of the district minority average of 59 percent). Contrary to the dissents argument, post, at 44, the Louisville school districts interest in remedying its past de jure segregation did vanish the day the District Court found that Louisville had eliminated the vestiges of its historic de jure segregation. Justice Kennedy sets forth two additional concerns related to narrow tailoring. In respect to Louisville, he says first that officials stated (1) that kindergarten assignments are not subject to the race-conscious guidelines, and (2) that the child at issue here was denied permission to attend the kindergarten he wanted because of those guidelines. The Seattle School Board challenged the constitutionality of the initiative. See 448 U. S., at 539. In 1956, two years after Brown made clear that Kentucky could no longer require racial segregation by law, the Louisville Board of Education created a geography-based student assignment plan designed to help achieve school integration. Properly analyzed, though, these plans do not fall within either existing category of permissible race-based remediation. Id. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. would support indefinite use of racial classifications, employed first to obtain the appropriate mixture of racial views and then to ensure that the [program] continues to reflect that mixture. First, no casenot Adarand, Gratz, Grutter, or any otherhas ever held that the test of strict scrutiny means that all racial classificationsno matter whether they seek to include or excludemust in practice be treated the same. 05915, at 38. Id. Sixteen years into the plan, 14 of 19 middle and high schools remained almost totally white or almost totally black. 05915, at 43 (Transfer applications can be denied because of lack of available space or, for students in grades other than Primary 1 (kindergarten), the racial guidelines in the Districts current student assignment plan); id., at 29 (The student assignment plan does not apply to . App. I cannot rely upon Swanns statement that the use of race-conscious limits is permissible without showing, rather than simply asserting, that the statement represents a constitutional principle firmly rooted in federal and state law. Because [o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens, such race-based decisionmaking is unconstitutional. Justice Breyers dissent takes a different approach to these cases, one that fails to ground the result it would reach in law. But I am quite comfortable in the company I keep. See Washington State Report The suggestion that our decision today is somehow inconsistent with our disposition of that appeal is belied by the fact that neither the lower courts, the respondent school districts, nor any of their 51 amici saw fit even to cite the case. First, there is a historical and remedial element: an interest in setting right the consequences of prior conditions of segregation. Jefferson County Public Schools operates the public school system in metropolitan Louisville, Kentucky. Compare Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. 2d 290, 294 (1967); Booker v. Board of Ed. PICS argues, however, that the Seattle School District is doing just thatemploying racial balancing for the sole purpose of achieving racial diversity in its individual schools. The dissents permissive strict scrutiny (which bears more than a passing resemblance to rational-basis review) could invite widespread governmental deployment of racial classifications. Thus, the opinions reasoning is long. See ante, at 9 (Executive and legislative branches, which for generations now have considered these types of policies and procedures, should be permitted to employ them with candor and with confidence that a constitutional violation does not occur whenever a decisionmaker considers the impact a given approach might have on students of different races). Get free summaries of new US Supreme Court opinions delivered to your inbox! Compare Brief for Appellees in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1952, No. See, e.g., Brief for Appellees on Reargument in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1953, No. It therefore reversed the lower courts original finding of no discrimination and remanded, instructing the lower court to issue an injunction to prevent the District from using this system. See Tr. Each of these premises is, in my respectful view, incorrect. To begin with, Justice Breyer seeks to justify the plans at issue under our precedents recognizing the compelling interest in remedying past intentional discrimination. Dist. PICS also argues that the lower courts neglected to apply the correct strict scrutiny standard and instead gave undo deference to the school board. KORRELL ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER MR. KORRELL: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court. At the elementary school level, based on his or her address, each student is designated a resides school to which students within a specific geographic area are assigned; elementary resides schools are grouped into clusters in order to facilitate integration. App. Accord, post, at 48 ([L]ocal school boards better understand their own communities and have a better knowledge of what in practice will best meet the educational needs of their pupils); post, at 66 ([W]hat of respect for democratic local decisionmaking by States and school boards?); ibid. This sometimes leads to a disparity in resources and academic achievement between school districts. For example, in Wygant v. Jackson Bd. Consequently, even though the issue was in some respect moot with respect to that petitioner, jurisdiction existed. The student assignment plan of Seattle Public Schools and Jefferson County Public Schools does not meet the narrowly tailored and compelling interest requirements for a race-based assignment plan because it is used only to achieve "racial balance." Assigning to each student a personal designation according to a crude system of individual racial classifications is quite a different matter; and the legal analysis changes accordingly. Rev. 1 is an important case to educators, parents and students. Purportedly benign race-based decisionmaking suffers the same constitutional infirmity as invidious race-based decisionmaking. ; race, for some students, is determinative standing alone. http: //www.seattleschools.org/area/siso/disprof/2005/DP05 all.pdf. For the reasons discussed above, however, I disagree with Justice Kennedy that Seattle and Louisville have not done enough to demonstrate that their present plans are necessary to continue upon the path set by Brown. In Seattle School Dist. Primary and secondary schools are where the education of this Nations children begins, where each of us begins to absorb those values we carry with us to the end of our days. D (collecting citations of state and federal cases [w]hich [e]nunciate the [p]rinciple that [s]tate [l]aws [p]roviding for [r]acial [s]egregation in the [p]ublic [s]chools do not [c]onflict with the Fourteenth Amendment). Studies suggest that children taken from those schools and placed in integrated settings often show positive academic gains. This interest, the Court said, can be achieved by considering the student overall, not just his or her race, and the contribution he or she can make to the schools diversity. of Boston in 1968. For Swann is predicated upon a well-established legal view of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 20002001, when the racial tiebreaker was last used, Ballards total enrollment was 17.5 percent Asian-American, 10.8 percent African-American, 10.7 percent Latino, 56.4 percent Caucasian, and 4.6 percent Native-American. In the context of public schooling, segregation is the deliberate operation of a school system to carry out a governmental policy to separate pupils in schools solely on the basis of race. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. 377 F.3d at 959. They are tied to each districts specific racial demographics, rather than to any pedagogic concept of the level of diversity needed to obtain the asserted educational benefits. Hundreds of state and federal statutes and regulations use racial classifications for educational or other purposes. And what of laws concern to diminish and peacefully settle conflict among the Nations people? Only then must the judge defer to a democratic majority. Racial imbalance is not segregation, and the mere incantation of terms like resegregation and remediation cannot make up the difference. The school districts in these cases have not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once againeven for very different reasons. as Amici Curiae 29. Seattle School District No. And it expanded the transfer opportunities available to elementary and middle school pupils. Public School Dist., pp. App. of Boston v. Board of Education, O.T. 1967, No. Under no fair reading, though, can the majority opinion in Gratz be cited as authority to sustain the racial classifications under consideration here. The District argues that its use of race in high school admissions serves three compelling government interests: (1) the educational benefits of a diverse student body; (2) the reduction of racial isolation and de facto segregation; and (3) providing equality of opportunity to all students. 1. Family Law Center Abstract In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 05908, at 284a. What does the plurality say in response? Executive and legislative branches, which for generations now have considered these types of policies and procedures, should be permitted to employ them with candor and with confidence that a constitutional violation does not occur whenever a decisionmaker considers the impact a given approach might have on students of different races. Indeed, if there is no such plan, or if such plans are purely imagined, it is understandable why, as the plurality notes, ante, at 27, Seattle school officials concentrated on diminishing the racial component of their districts plan, but did not pursue eliminating that element entirely. Such reservations and preliminary analyses of course did not decide the merits of this questionas evidenced by the disagreement among the lower courts on this issue. In due course, the Washington Supreme Court, the Federal District Court, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (sitting en banc) rejected the challenge and found Seattles plan lawful. 233234 (Summer 2001) (describing this effect in schools in Charlotte, North Carolina). of Cal. Swann addresses only a possible state objective; it says nothing of the permissible meansrace conscious or otherwisethat a school district might employ to achieve that objective. Id., at 73. The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc, 395 F.3d 1168 (2005), and overruled the panel decision, affirming the District Courts determination that Seattles plan was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d, at 11921193. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI A compelling interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a school district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to pursue. The dissent makes much of the supposed difficulty of determining whether prior segregation was de jure or de facto. Unless we believe that the Constitution enforces one legal standard for the South and another for the North, this Court should grant Seattle the permission it granted Clarke County, Georgia. In Seattle, the plaintiffs alleged that school segregation unconstitutionally reflected not only generalized societal discrimination and residential housing patterns, but also school board policies and actions that had helped to create, maintain, and aggravate racial segregation. 2d 358, 359, 363, 370, 377 (WD Ky. 2000) (Hampton II). [Footnote 11]. Id., at 483487. 2d 304 (quoting Bakke, supra, at 315, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 57 L. Ed. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (U.S. 2007). See Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U. S. 167, 189. in No. As Jefferson County explains, the racial guidelines have minimal impact in this process, because they mostly influence student assignment in subtle and indirect ways. Brief for Respondents in No. in No. [29] The districts have also failed to show that they considered methods other than explicit racial classifications to achieve their stated goals. See ibid. See, e.g., Exec. The Constitution and our precedents require more. The remedy, though, was limited in time and limited to the wrong. ORAL ARGUMENT OF HARRY J.F. of Ed. See supra, at 4648. See 377 F.3d 949, 10051006 (CA9 2004) (Parents Involved VI) (Graber, J., dissenting). In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law). For the 2006-2007 school year, the school district has suspended the tiebreaker pending litigation. In support of the third benefit, the District cites findings that minority students in fully integrated schools often perform better academically and are more likely to find work in an integrated workplace. 05915, at 410. These plans are unnecessarily crude solutions to the problem of school segregation, which can be achieved through more indirect means. Add to the inconclusive social science the fact of black achievement in racially isolated environments. Id. 2d 304. And, in Seattle, the disadvantaged student loses at most one year at the high school of his choice. Although the Constitution almost always forbids the former, it is significantly more lenient in respect to the latter. 05-908, was filed by a group of parents who had formed a nonprofit corporation to. And if Seattle School Dist. This decision departs from long-standing jurisprudence on school desegregation. The passage Justice Stevens quotes proves our point; all the quoted language says is that the school committee shall prepare a plan to eliminate the imbalance. Id., at 695, 227 N.E. 2d, at 731; see post, at 4, n. 5. Neither party disputes, however, that Joshuas transfer application was denied under the racial guidelines, and Merediths objection is not that the guidelines were misapplied but rather that race was used at all. How do the educational and civic interests differ in kind from those that underlie and justify the racial diversity that the law school sought in Grutter, where this Court found a compelling interest? Chief Justice Roberts announced the judgment of the Court, and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, IIIA, and IIIC, and an opinion with respect to Parts IIIB and IV, in which Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito join. 2d 304. At the same time it relies on inapplicable desegregation cases, misstatements of admitted dicta, and other noncontrolling pronouncements, Justice Breyers dissent candidly dismisses the significance of this Courts repeated holdings that all racial classifications must be reviewed under strict scrutiny, see post, at 3133, 3536, arguing that a different standard of review should be applied because the districts use race for beneficent rather than malicious purposes, see post, at 3136. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S. 717, 740741, and n.19 (1974). The cost of busing, the harm that members of all racial communities feared that the Seattle Plan caused, the desire to attract white families back to the public schools, and the interest in providing greater school choice led the board to abandon busing and to substitute a new student assignment policy that resembles the plan now before us. We are not social engineers. See supra, at 1214. 1. This approach is just as wrong today as it was a half-century ago. The statistics cited in Appendix A to the dissent are not to the contrary. For Brown held out a promise. of Cal. Post, at 41. 5. Both districts rethought their methods over time and explored a wide range of other means, including non-race-conscious policies. In fact, all the cases Justice Breyers dissent cites as evidence of the prevailing legal assumption, see post, at 2527, were decided before this Court definitively determined that all racial classifications must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peńa, 515 U. S. 200, 227 (1995). The dissent avoids reaching that conclusion by unquestioningly accepting the assertions of selected social scientists while completely ignoring the fact that those assertions are the subject of fervent debate. Answer: the equal protection clause Explanation: the Supreme Court ruled in brown v board of education that separate public accommodations for African Americans where discernibly unequal and thus violated the 14th amendments equal protection clause Advertisement New questions in History United States v. Fordice, 505 U. S. 717, 745 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). The majority suggests that Seattles classification system could permit a school to be labeled diverse with a 50% Asian-American and 50% white student body, and no African-American students, Hispanic students, or students of other ethnicity.